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REASON IX SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY
RV \1CT0R S. YARROS
RE(^r>NSTRFCTI( )N is taking place in philosophy. The need
of the critical as well as the positive work now being done in
that high realm is admitted by everybody entitled to an opinion on
the subject. Unfortunately, not all the workers are proceeding un-
der a plan, and, as we know, the world just now is profoundly in-
terested in planning—economic, political, social and scientific. Re-
construction is a term which implies a plan and definite responsi-
bility in some quarter for that plan.
Perhaps the truth is that what is taking place in philosophy is
not really actual reconstruction, but something more modest, some-
thing preliminary and preparatory, something confused yet neces-
sary and valuable.
There is much activity and much discussion of raw materials,
methods, principles, old and new concepts. Almost everything is
in the melting pot. Once familiar tags and formula? have lost their
meaning. There is more disagreement than agreement.
This is not surprising, but it is regrettable that the workers
do not use the same language. That is to say, they do not take care
to create a basis for understanding. Certain essential terms in the
most fundamental propositions are used in diiTerent senses : defini-
tions vary, and a good deal of philosophical controversy is carried
on w'ithout the slightest regard for the meaning of the words an-;l
phrases employed. Little efl:ort is made to separate major from
minor premises, premises from conclusions, assumptions from veri-
fied and accepted findings.
Bertrand Russell once said that no philosopher has ever under-
stood any other philosopher. That seemed a wailful paradox, a
facetious exaggeration. But whether philosophy was or was not a
Babel of tongues in the past, it certainly is that today. It is not
advancing or getting anywhere.
It is a fact, for example, that Pragmatism as a philosophy has
already demonstrated its sterility and impotence. It brought forth
a few arresting and significant ideas, but these did not constitute
a philosophy. There has been no growth since, and now even the
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few original contributions credited to Pragmatism are being vigor-
ously challeng-ed.
The foregoing" remarks may seem unduly pessimistic or ex-
travagant, but they are suggested l)y a concrete example, the ap-
pearance of, and reaction to, a new volume on philosophy from the
pen of Prof. Alorris R. Cohen of Xew York, a thinker of excep-
tional intellectual powers and extraordinar}- erudition who has
many admirers and followers. The work is entitled Reason ajid
Nature. An Essay on the Meaning of Seientifiie Method. The
author is not a builder of synthetic philosophic systems, but he is a
keen critic of existing jihilosophies as well as of modern science.
He is anxious to establish a point of departure, a proper conception
of method. Alany of the current errors and fallacies in science, in-
cluding sociology and psychology, and in ])hilosophical specula-
tion. Prof. Cohen attributes to crude and faulty methods, or wrong
postulates, or both. Anticipating certain objections from those who
are more interested in final judgments than in the process of ar-
riving at such judgments. Prof. Cohen thus tries to disarm op-
ponents :
To those [he writes] who lal:)or under the necessity of
passing judgment on this book in terms of current values,
I suggest the following
:
The author seems out of touch with everything modern
and useful, and yet makes no whole-hearted plea for the
old. He believes in chance and spontaneit}' in physics, and
law and mechanism in life. He has no respect for experi-
ence, induction, the dynamic, evolution, progress, behavior-
ism, and psycho-analysis, and does not line up with either
the orthodox or the revolutionary party in politics, or re-
ligion, though he writes on these themes.
Prof. Cohen assures his readers that he has profound faith
in philosophy itself, whatever follies are committed in its name.
Pending the emergence of a satisfactory philosophy that will fur-
nish answers to fundamental issues, what we need, according to him,
is cultivated and disciplined reason. It is reason that preserves
what is best in civiliz;ation, and it is reason disciplined that pre-
vents us from worshipping false gods, trying worthless or noxious
nostrums, or espousing wild and mischievous ideas.
To cultivate and discipline reason, however, science is not
enough, and neither is philosophy. We have need of all our intel-
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lectual assets and weapons—science, logic, common sense, and phi-
losophy.
Prof. Cohen is impatient with and contemptuous of Bergson's
intuitionism. clan vital, etc., as well as with William James" piece-
meal supernaturalism, irrationalism, and will to believe. History, he
contends, teaches us the great lesson that, in the long run, reason
alone counts. To those who claim inner illuminations, the voice of
faith or of the heart, he says: "You cannot both distrust logic and
claim logical cogency for your own ( fallacious ) arguments."
But when do we know that our reason is disciplined and culti-
vated, or that we ha\e adopted the right and true position upon a
question that is still cpen and unsettled ? Does any school or thinker
ever admit that his reasoning is illogical and lame? Prof. Cohen of-
fers a test of right reason, finding it in what he calls the principle
of polarity, which is the principle of balance and synthetic unity.
The orthodox dogmatist is wrong, as is the revolutionary, because
neither sees the other side of the question he professes to have
solved. Superficial thinking generally is attributable to violation
of the principle of balance and unity.
There is no wide difl:'erence between this view and the famous
Hegelian formula—thesis, antithesis and synthesis. The difficul-
ty is in. determining the correct application of the test—of any
test. No school, however extreme it seems to us, admits that it
has sinned against the principle of polarity or has not endeavored
to w'ork out a synthetic solution. The communist, the fascist, the
liberal, the conservative, the evolutionary radical, severally claim
to have weighed all sides and to have arrived at a reasonable syn-
thesis. There is no way of settling intellectual controversies ex-
cept bv leaving the final judgment to time. That, however, is hind-
sight, not foresight, and certainly one of the functions of philoso-
phy, as of science, is to foresee, direct, and guide.
Whether or not one acce[)ts all the ideas and views set forth in
the comprehensive work, it is safe to say that no really scientific
and philosophical thinker will challenge the author's leading or
important propositions. But the work, curiously enough, makes
not for agreement, but for polemics and contention. Prof. Cohen
seems to take special pleasure in puncturing fallacies, revealing
contradictions, and directing attention to misty and nebulous state-
ments. He has irritated some of the philosophers he particularly
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admires, quarreling with them about terms and definitions, paren-
thetical remarks, and nonessential points generally.
Particularly provocative is his Epilogue, a wholly superfluous
essay in "dispraise of life, experience and reality." In this chapter
Prof. Cohen is joy-riding, poking fun at other thiukers and making
hash of their formulas and concepts. Of course, no one can seri-
ously inveigh against life, experience, or reality. But Prof. Cohen
selects phrases he deems vague or paradoxical, and gleefully pounces
upon them.
If philosophers would but take the trouble to start with careful
definitions, how much confusion and waste they would avoid !
Take the w^ord "life." Prof. Cohen does not like that term, and
criticises William James's remark—wholly innocent—that a cer-
tain philosopher pleased him because his books had "the tang of
life." Life! scornfully exclaims Cohen; why, there is bad life,
empty life and sordid, worthless life. He thought, he adds, that
philosophers were concerned to teach and inculcate the good life.
It was rank heresy, then, to praise any work for its alleged savor
and flavor of life.
Xow this, as Prof. Dewey has said, is mere and sheer quibbling.
James had no intention of disparaging goodness in his commenda-
tion of a book he had found vital and stimulating. ITe was weary
of dull, tiresome, lifeless books on philosophy, and glad to welcome
a work that, at least, had the merit of possessing readableness,
power, the tang of life. He, a humanist and militant progressive,
would have been the first to condemn a book that glorified or ren-
dered attractive the bad, \'icious or selfish life. To preach the good
life to James is to cap the climax of supererogation!
Then there is the term experience. Prof. Cohen rails at those
]5hilosophers who overrate the value of personal, immediate, direct,
sensuous experience, and leave but little room for rigorous logical
thinking and the use of reason. He dislikes the word because to
him it denotes what he calls "events in personal biographies." Per-
haps the average man does use experience in that restricted sense,
but the scientific thinker knows that human experience includes
much more than immediate and vivid sensations. Instead of railing
at experience, why not attempt agreement at the outset upon a
proper definition of the term?
Reason, or the process of reasoning, is itself an experience, says
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Prof. Cohen. And to reason, he contends rightly, is to assume
laws or invariant relations in nature. If no such relatioris, or uni-
formities, existed, no finite numher of physical sensations or per-
sonal experiences could i^rove the existence of any universal prin-
ciple of law. All this is true, hut only the decaying school of sen-
sationalistic particularism needs such reminders. With the other
schools it is almost a maxim that reason is the interpreter of sen-
sations and personal exix'riences, and that the j-jroccss of reasoning
considers the larger experiences of whole societies, races and civili-
zations in the light of the theory- of natural laws and causal relations.
Prof. Cohen is a rationalist of a particular tyi)e, and he stresses
the role of deduction in reaching conclusions, lie insists that de-
duction is more than a process of summing up and restating known
facts or ]:)ropositions, hut a means of discovering new truths and
facts. However, his rationalism is not as free from convenient as-
sumptions as he thinks is the case. As Prof. Dewey has pointed
out, our keen and penetrating author fails to distinguish ]:)etween
"empiricism" and "sensationalist particularism," and wins easy vic-
tories for his style of rationalism. What he does not face is the
question how actual personal experience gets converted and trans-
lated into rational thought.
Much of the confusion that exists in philosoi)h\- today can be
traced, further, to lack of any agreement as to the nature of reality
and the relation between it and the human mind or the realm of
ideas. \\'hat is nature, and what makes us sure that our idea of
nature is correct?
Prof. Cohen distinguishes between nature and our idea of na-
ture. He cannot belicAe, he says, that "science creates the sun when
it discovers its chemical composition." We cannot, he contends,
study mind unless we are familiar with the nature pictured to us by
physics, physiology and biology. Psychology is becoming scien-
tific, but precisely because it is built largely on the more exact
sciences and their concepts of nature and reality.
The work as a whole, however, is a brilliant and effective de-
fense of reason, and of the methods developed by reason in the
course of the ages. Prof. Cohen does not treat intuition, tradition,
authority, common sense as usurpers and invaders. He recognizes
the contributions made by them, severally, to science and to prac-
tical human life. But he argues, and proves, that the final appeal,
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after all, is to reason, reflective and discursive. It is reason that
analyzes and compares supposed intuitions, critically appraises
authority, extends and corrects common sense. The notion that rea-
son or intelligence is nothing but a tool for everyday purposes, en-
tertained in different forms by Spencer, Bergson et al, he con-
siders shallow and naive. If reason cannot give us glimpses of the
higher and finer things, what can? And do we not use reason in
dealing with the most abstract conceptions and generalizations?
Those who talk of flashes and sudden revelations, says Prof.
Cohen, forget that to the ignorant no such illumination is vouch-
safed. Knowledge is their pre-requisite.
I quote a few characteristic sentences from the book which in-
dicate Prof. Cohen's ])osition and mode of thinking:
"The true method of science is to cure speculative ex-
cesses, not by a return to pure experience devoid of all as-
sumptions, but by multiplying through pure logic the num-
ber of these assumptions, mathematically deducing their va-
rious consequences, and then confronting each one with its
rivals and such experimental facts as can be generally es-
tablished."
"Intelligence is the rational organization or distillation
of the experience of living. . . . L'nlcss intelligence illumines
the meaning of our \ital activity, we can make no signifi-
cant assertion about it nor draw any conclusion from it. . . .
No philosophy which stresses formless feeling can throw
light on the problem of artistic creation or its intelligent
appreciation."
"A philosophy which excludes the subject-matter of the
special sciences, natural and social, cannot satisfy that in-
terest in the cosmos which has at all times been the heart
of philosophic endeaA'or. ... Philosophy, seeking the most
comprehensive vision, cannot ignore the insight gained by
the sciences, but must go forward to envisage their possible
synthesis."
"If this doctrine that our universe contains something
fundamental to which we may point, but which we cannot
fidly describe, be called mysticism, then mysticism is es-
sential to all intellectual sanity. But if we use the word
mysticism to denote this faith in a universe that has inefi:'-
able and alogical elements, we cannot too sharply distin-
guish it from obscurantism. For the former denies our
power to know the whole of reality, while the latter holds
reality to be definitely revealed to us by non-rational pro-
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cesses. .
.
.The essential difference between rationalism and
obscurantism depends upon whether our guesses or ol)-
scure visions do or do not sul:)mit to the processes of critical
examination and logical clarification."
"If the abstract is unreal, reality is of little moment.
For what is humanly interesting if not the abstract?"
Let us note here that Prof. Cohen, disagreeing with recent de-
finitions of jihilosopliy, reverts to the Spencerian idea that the busi-
ness and function of philosophy is to build up a synthetic world-
view, or JJ'clfaiischauiiiig. on the foundations laid and materials
provided by the several sciences. The ditficulties in the way of
such a philosophy are numerous and serious, Prof. Cohen admits,
but. he says, difficulties are not vetoes, and if they were treated
as such, philosophy would lose its mission and raisoii d'etre. He
sums up this matter as follows
:
The sciences grow by constantlv correcting their con-
tent, and it is the inesca])al)le task of the philosopher to
use the invariant principles of the scientific method, to go
back to ever more rigorous analysis of the elements or
rudiments of our knowledge, to examine the ideals which
guide scientific eiTort, and to anticipate wdiere possible
what science mav conquer in the future.
There is little essential originality in Prof. Cohen's solid and
pregnant \olume. but he lays no claim to originality. The impor-
tance of his book, at this juncture, lies in its remarkable statement
and defense of the role of reason and its clear exposition of the
proper methods and procedures of science and scientific philosophy.
The erudition displayed by Prof. Cohen is amazing, but it is eru-
dition assimilated, mastered, subordinated to fundamental concepts.
Perhaps the book covers too much groimd and is here and there
a little inadequate and superficial. Some of the chapters—notably
those on biology and psycholog}'—require expansion and elabor-
ation. We must hope that another volume from the same gifted
pen will not be delayed too long. The author surely feels that in
some instances his brevity caused misunderstanding and misinter-
pretation of his views even among friendly reviewers.
THE PRIXCIPLE OF POLARITY THEORY AXD PRACTICE
It will be interesting and profitable to consider here somewhat
critically the principle of polarity as elucidated and defended by
Prof. ^lorris Cohen. Is the principle new to science and philoso-
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phy? If so, what does it do for us in matters of practical reform?
In the pragmatists' phrase, what difference does it make ; or, in the
words of James, what is its cash value?
According to Prof. Cohen, the principle is not a new discovery.
On the contrary, it is old, "as old as philosophy," for its recog-
nition may be found in the works of most ancient and mediaeval
philosophers. Moreover, common sense, we are informed, has al-
ways acted in conformity with it after its own crude fashion, though
it was not aware of the fact—any more than Moliere's hero was
aware of the fact that for forty years he "had spoken prose." Full
and intelligent appreciation of the principle is expected, however,
to yield large benefits to contemporary thinkers who find it intel-
lectually impossible to associate themselves with doctrinaires and
extremists.
To cjuote Prof. Cohen
:
The indetermination and consequent inconclusiveness of
metaphysical and of a good deal of sociological discus-
sion results from uncritically adhering to simple alterna-
tives, instead of resorting to the laborious process of inte-
grating opposite assertions by finding the proper distinc-
tions and ciualification.
Thus two statements which, taken abstractly, are con-
tradictory may both be true of concrete existence, provided
they can be assigned to separate domains or aspects. A
plurality of aspects is an essential trait of things in exis-
tence.
And the princii)le itself is thus defined by the professor:
Opposites such as immediacy and mediation, unity and
plurality, the fixed and the flux, substance and function,
ideal and real, actual and possible, etc., like the north (posi-
tive) and the south (negative) poles of a magnet, all involve
each other when applied to any significant entity.
And the author adds
:
Far from overriding the distinctions of understanding,
the principle of polarity shows their necessity and proper
use.
To the foregoing no exception can be taken. Rut, in the last
analysis, what does the argument amount to? To this simply, that
questions generally, if not invariably, have two or more sides, and
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that all sides orght to be driven due consideration if a just conclu-
sion is to be reached. Well, in the administration of justice this
principle, or maxim, is exemplified daily and hourly. In a criminal
case, the prosecution and the defense are given practically ecfual
opportunity to ]iersuade the judge and the jury. The judge is an
impartial umpire and the jury's gride. The jury is bound and in-
structed to consider all the evidence without Ijias and to render its
judgment in accordance with the clear weight of the evidence, gi\-
ing the defendant the benefit of e\er\- reas(inal)le doubt. In a civil
case, the doctrine of reasonal)le (lou])t gives place to that of pre-
ponderant e\idence merely.
Of course, judges and juries arc human and prone to err. Jus-
tice not infrequently miscarries. Emotion, ]irejudice, class or group
interest may blind judge and jury alike. lUit it is to be noted that
consciousness of passion and bias is rare, llie principle of polarity
is not willingly violated. The verdict ma\- be woefully unfair, but
those who handed it down do not concede that it is unfair. They
are satisfied that they considered all the evidence and reasoned
about it logically and candidly.
What is true of legal disputes is true of all other controversies.
Take politics, economics, ethics, religion, history. Let us put a
number of questions covering a wide and diversified field. Did
Jesus of the Gospels e\er live, or is he a mythical figure? Was
the murder of Caesar morallv justifiable? Did the German em-
peror and his military advisers will the world-war? Is democracy a
possible and feasible form of government ? Would the single tax
on land values abolish j^overty? Is capital ])unishment just and
necessary ? Are acquired characters inheritable and inherited ? Is
Capitalism digging its own grave, as ^Vlarx asserted was the case,
or has it sufiicient virtue and vitality to correct its own mistakes
and remedy its own ills? Is effective control, in the public in-
terest, of great and powerful utilities possible, or must utility regu-
lation and control lead to state ownership and operation ?
Prof. Cohen will tell us that no political, social, or other ques-
tion can be settled rightly unless in the process of adjustment the
principle of polarity is recognized and respected. Ikit no school,
group, or party ever admits that its program or proferred solution
is one-sided, short-sighted, ill-considered, superficial. Whether a
given solution is sound or unsound cannot be determined by any
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general appeal to polarity. It must be determined by reasoninis^ ap-
plied to tbe facts and relevant considerations.
Can we contend that, philosophically speaking, the truth always
lies between two opposite views? Would such a principle be valid?
Certainly not. The final answer to a question is often either Yes or
No. We cannot say that Protection is and is not essential to national
development, or that the Single Tax will and will not abolish pover-
ty, or that democracy is and is not feasible and desirable, or that
acquired characters are and are not inheritable. W^e cannot say
that this i^erson is and is not guilty of an offence charged, or that
the verdict of a jury was and was not just and warranted by the
evidence adduced.
The truth may lie in the middle, and it may lie at the extreme
end. There is no a priori reason for holding in advance where it
will be found. Polarity does not excuse jumping at conclusions.
There is, in fact, no royal road to truth. Science and philoso-
phy arrive at truths, or generalizations, l)y the pedestrian and thorny
path of trial, error, verification, re-verification, modification and
restatment. What they say to the individual thinker is: "Make sure
of your data. Define your problem with ])recision and care. Weigh
your evidence, and form your theory, when ready for that stage,
provisionally, inviting criticism and examination. Never be dog-
matic, for new facts ma}' come to light that will dictate revision of
your theory. Remember that science and philosophy are progres-
sive and dynamic. There is no revelation for either of them. If
you start with an assumption, bear that fact in mind, and do not
claim that you have proved every point in the argument and every
premise, expressed or implied."
These admonitions have the support of human experiences.
Polarity does not sum them up sufiiciently.
Let me now revert to two of Prof. Cohen's own illustrations
and see how he uses polarity. To quote
:
If I say a house is thirty years old, and some one else
says it is thirty-one years old, the statements are contradic-
tory in the sense that both cannot possibly be true at the
same time and in the same respect. Both statements, how-
ever, can certainly be true if we draw a distinction, e.g.,
thirty-one years since the beginning and thirty years since
the completion of its building.
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Sometimes an intellectual dilemma is avoided by reject-
ing both alternatives. This is illustrated by the old difficul-
ty as to whether language was a human invention or a
special revelation. The difficulty was avoided by introduc-
ing the concept of natural growth.
Neither illustration strikes me as a hap]:)y or apt one. Neither
involves the application of the polarity principle. In the case of
the house, both statements lacked precision, and an exact and com-
plete statement, if one had been demanded, would have removed
the ambiguity and left no room for controversy. In the case of
language, neither of the old theories had any scientific validity, while
the concept of natural growth was suggested by study and experi-
ence, and had no aid from or. indeed, need of the polarity i:)rinciple.
I'rof. Cohen appears to claim more for the principle than it is
capable of yielding to science or to life. He must have been mis-
led l)y a few instances in which polarity does remove difficulties by
a sort of s\nthesis. ( )n the whole, one fails to perceive in his
theory any improvement on the Hegelian formula—Thesis, Anti-
thesis, Synthesis. But even this formula should not be stretched
unduly or overworked. To repeat, there is no royal road to truth,
as Prof. Cohen himself reminds us over and over arain.
